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Silencing grievance: responding to human rights violations in Mexico’s 
war on drugs 
 
ABSTRACT 
Scholarly studies addressing the issue of human rights abuses in Mexico’s war on drugs could 
be classified into two groups. A first cluster of literature addresses the deployment of legal 
dispositions that allow the commission of human rights abuses. A second cluster of studies 
analyses the consequences of such political or legal dispositions: e.g., the use of torture. 
However, I suggest, to increase our understanding of Mexico’s human rights crisis a third 
analysis is needed – the study of the official discourse that authorizes such disturbing legal 
dispositions and its effects. This article is a sociological driven analysis of the government 
responses to human rights abuses between 2007 and 2012. The Calderón administration 
deployed what can be termed the policing of uncomfortable truths, which served to deny or 
justify the occurrence of atrocity. The article also suggests the effects such policy had in victims 
of abuses, perpetrators and bystanders of atrocity.  
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Silencing grievance: responding to human rights violations in Mexico’s 
war on drugs 
The end of Mexico’s seventy year authoritarian rule in 2000 did not improve the human 
rights situation of the country. On the contrary, in the last decade, Mexico has faced a 
crisis of unprecedented violence, where gross human rights violations are widespread 
(Amnesty International 2013; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [IACHR] 
2013). According to many observers, Mexico’s human rights crisis was triggered by the 
“war on drugs” launched by President Felipe Calderón in 2006 (Human Rights Watch 
[HRW] 2011; IACHR 2015; FIDH 2017). It is in this context that an emerging 
scholarly literature on drug-related violence in Mexico focuses on the relationship 
between the war and the increasing number of human rights abuses. This literature can 
be, perhaps prematurely, classified into two groups. A first cluster of literature examines 
the set of legal dispositions deployed by the Mexican government allegedly to control 
drug-traffickers; dispositions that allow human rights abuses to take place, such as 
“arraigo detention” – that is, the imprisonment of citizens without formal charges for 
up to 80 days (Madrazo Lajous 2014; Deaton and Rodriguez Ferreira 2015). More 
recently, a second cluster of studies has examined the concrete effects that result from 
the implementation of such legal dispositions, for example, arbitrary detention, torture, 
extrajudicial killings (Daly et al., 2012; Magaloni Kerpel 2015; Pérez Correa et al. 
2015). Both clusters of research are relevant given the continuing and devastating 
effects of Mexico’s war on drugs. However, these studies remain incomplete without an 
examination of the official vocabulary that authorizes such disturbing legal dispositions 
(e.g. arraigo detention) and its concomitant effects (e.g. torture). 
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Hence this article explores the official discourse articulated by the Calderón 
administration (2006–2012) to address accusations of gross violations of human rights. 
The article shows how in the face of growing denunciations of serious abuses 
committed by state agents, the Calderón administration responded with what Stan 
Cohen (1996; 2001: 101) termed a “discourse of official denial” — a discourse that 
sought to deny, reinterpret, or justify the perpetration of well-known atrocities. In doing 
so, the article seeks to disclose how the discourse of official denial obscures the reality 
of gross human rights violations and leads to their legitimization. It also seeks to shed 
light on the interplay between discourse and agency. 
Conceptually, this article departs from the dominant literature on drug-related 
violence that focuses on state officials as professional policymakers whose role is to 
devise sophisticated strategies to combat drug consumption, neutralize organized crime, 
or reduce criminal violence (Chabat 2010; Shirk 2011; Benítez Manaut 2010). Instead, 
this article is concerned with the role of the state as an agent that, in the context of the 
war on drugs, systematically and extensively violates human rights (Open Society 
Fundation 2016; Amnesty International et al., 2015). The role of the Mexican state and 
its agents as perpetrators of gross human rights abuses has been largely ignored by the 
academic literature. This article is thus a contribution toward building a cluster of 
academic literature that critically analyzes the disturbing mechanisms of social and 
political control exerted by the contemporary Mexican state. 
 Normatively, this article argues that no account of Mexico’s current human 
rights crisis is complete without taking into account the government’s official discourse 
on the matter. By naming serious human rights violations for what they are, this 
research may help to unmask the culture of denial that surrounds acts of state violence 
in Mexico. As Huggins et al (2002: 19) rightly claim, “it is not just the behavior of 
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victims, perpetrators, and their governments that shapes social memory about atrocity”; 
the way scholars and human rights practitioners “conceptualize and study atrocity can 
influence the content and scope of memory construction as well”. 
Two possible after-effects of this discourse of official denial are explored below. 
First, this discourse could be facilitating a linguistic and ideological arsenal for state 
officials to justify abuses, and neutralize any potential feelings of remorse. Second, this 
discourse of official denial may be preparing society to accept the routine occurrence of 
human rights violations. Why do ordinary Mexicans, to use Primo Levi’s (1987) words, 
seem to be “incapable of conceiving of a terrorism directed by the state, even when it 
[is] already all around them”? 
To explore how human rights information was communicated, I analyzed texts 
published between 2006 and 2012 by human rights organizations in the form of press 
releases, special reports, and annual reports. I also conducted a thorough analysis of the 
government’s public statements and policy documents produced in response to 
accusations made to them of their human rights abuses.  
Before I proceed with my analysis, some clarifications are needed. This article 
focuses on the Calderón administration (2006-2012). The current war on drugs was 
inaugurated by President Calderón and became the central policy of his administration. 
Consequently, the government invested abundant time and resources in official 
propaganda to legitimize such war. This is also why this analysis focuses on the 
discourse of the Executive branch of government. Congress did not propose the war: it 
was a policy deployed and rhetorically justified by the Presidency. Local governors and 
municipal mayors have openly supported the war and echoed the official propaganda 
through the local press. However, this article focuses on the texts published by the most 
influential national newspapers and news magazines. The Enrique Peña Nieto 
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administration (2012-2018) perpetuated the war and intensified the militarization of the 
country. Yet, unlike President Calderón, Peña Nieto stopped talking about it at least 
during his first years in office. That is, in practice, the war continued as before, but it 
disappeared from the official discourse almost entirely. 
 
Human rights in Mexico’s permanent state of exception  
Public policies aimed at dealing with drug trafficking were not introduced by the 
Calderón administration. During Mexico’s authoritarian regime (1929-2000), “the 
military, traffickers, police, and political officials all took a cut from the narcotics 
traffic” passing through Mexico, “keeping violence to relatively low levels because all 
groups had a stake in a smoothly conducted business”; thus, the Mexican government 
“acted historically as overseer of the drug-industry” (Mercille 2013: 115). 
This situation changed with the accession of President Calderón to power. Less 
than two weeks after the start of his presidency, Calderón began what he named a “war” 
against organized crime (Presidencia de la República 2006). During his administration, 
more than 50,000 soldiers were involved in large-scale counternarcotics operations 
(HRW 2011: 4; Daly et al. 2012). The move was surprising since the fight against drug 
consumption and the trafficking of illicit substances was not a central theme in 
Calderón’s electoral campaign. Whatever his motives, the importance of this war is that 
it led to an unprecedented wave of violence. As Schedler (2014: 9) notes, “the 
government’s strategy of leadership decapitation…destabilized the entire system of 
criminal actors. It has fractured all relationships: within cartels, among cartels, and 
between cartels and the state”. The annual number of homicides rose from 8,000 in 
2006 to more than 27,000 in 2011. Thousands of persons have disappeared after being 
6 
abducted. According to official data, between 2007 and 2016 more than 28,000 persons 
went missing (Amnesty International et al. 2016: 4). 
The conventional vision on drug policies in Mexico has focused on the role 
played by the organized crime (Chabat 2010; Shirk 2011). This perspective is based on 
two explanations: first, drug cartels are the main protagonists of the war: they are killing 
each other and terrorize the population; second, the Mexican government runs the risk 
of being infiltrated by organized crime and must, therefore, do something to neutralize 
drug cartels (e.g., the use of military force). 
More critical studies disagree with these explanations and argue that the real 
causes behind the war have little to do with drugs. For instance, Julien Mercille (2011; 
2013) and Dawn Paley (2014) have demonstrated that the war on drugs has been useful 
to expand, protect, and police neoliberal policies that benefit mainly resource extraction 
companies. The war, they argue, has allowed the US government to offer economic 
cooperation and security assistance under the condition of implementing neoliberal 
reforms. For the Mexican government, the war serves as an excuse to militarize de 
country and to use security forces to repress activists, journalists, and critics of the 
regime (Mercille 2011: 1641; Mercille 2013: 118).  
An analysis of the motives behind the war on drugs is beyond the scope of this 
article. Whatever the real reasons behind it, the war has led to serious violations of 
human rights.  In 2011, HRW published a special report on Calderón’s war, whose title 
is self-descriptive: Neither Rights, Nor Security. HRW (2011: 5) found that the strategy 
of the Calderón administration was “badly failing on two fronts. It has not succeeded in 
reducing violence. Instead, it has resulted in a dramatic increase in grave human rights 
violations”. HRW (2011: 5) “found evidence of a significant increase in human rights 
violations since Calderón launched his “war on organized crime” ”. In particular, HRW 
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(2011: 5) warned that “members of security forces systematically use torture to obtain 
forced confessions and information” about alleged criminal groups. And evidence 
points to the “involvement of soldiers and police in extrajudicial killings and enforced 
disappearances around the country” (HRW, 2011: 5). Anticipating that the Calderón 
administration would seek to downplay the report, HRW clarified that the country was 
now facing not “isolated acts”, but rather an “endemic” problem (HRW 2011: 5). 
 Many non-governmental organizations, including various agencies of the United 
Nations, confirmed the findings of the HRW report. The conclusions were always the 
same: in the context of the war, the security forces of the Mexican state systematically 
perpetrated serious human rights violations, including cruel, inhumane, and degrading 
treatment; illegal detentions; torture,summary executions, and forced disappearances 
(ACHR 2015).  
 Juan Méndez, United Nations Special Rapporteur, for instance, concluded in 
2014 that “torture and ill-treatment are generalized in Mexico” (Méndez, 2014: 7). 
Méndez (2014: 6) found the serious human rights situation to have a well-defined 
setting: “since 2006, in the context of the so-called “war on drug trafficking”. One of 
the most disturbing findings of the United Nations Special Rapporteur was that in 
Mexico there is a “state of exception” that suspends: 
the constitutional and legal rights of detainees with alleged links to 
organized crime, which includes arraigo detention, pretrial detention 
without formal charges and the ability of the Public Prosecution Service to 
extend the period during which a person is detained or held before being 
brought before a judge (Méndez, 2014: 7).  
 
This explanation is correct, but it overlooks the fact that the state of exception has been 
extended indefinitely. The irony is evident: the country is living under what may be 
termed a permanent state of exception. 
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The official information is no better. The National Human Rights Commission, 
the foremost institution in the country tasked with the protection and promotion of 
human rights, acknowledged that between 2005 and 2012 received over 9,000 reports of 
arbitrary detentions carried out by agents of the Mexican government (Ballinas & 
Becerril 2012). The Commission was investigating approximately 2,000 cases of forced 
disappearance in which public officials were involved. In 2011, the Commission 
received 2,000 complaints of torture and inhumane treatment, which represented a 500 
percent increase over the previous five years. In sum, since the onset of the “war on 
drugs” in 2006, the Human Rights Commission received more than 34,000 complaints 
against federal state security agents. These complaints included atrocities committed 
only by members of the federal policy and the military (they do not include the abuses 
committed by local government agents, such as the municipal police). 
Thus, clearly, during the Calderón administration an extraordinary volume of 
information about human rights abuses was generated by journalists, scholars, local 
human rights organizations, and international bodies. So, how did the government 
respond to such information? Interestingly enough, the HRW (2011: 10) report included 
a section on what the organization called the “dangerous rhetoric” of the Calderón 
administration. HRW (2011) warned that state officials systematically dismiss victims’ 
allegations as untrue, and label (and treat) the victims as criminals —even as officials 
publicly claim to be firmly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights. 
“The model for this self-contradictory discourse”, claims HRW (2011: 10), “has been 
provided by President Calderón, who on the one hand talked about human rights as a 
central premise guiding his government’s policies, while on the other expressed his 
exasperation at hearing complaints ‘that are not true’ of abuses committed” by state 
agents, particularly by the military. This is why research that goes beyond the analysis 
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of the legal provisions used in the war against drugs (e.g. arraigo detention) and their 
effects (e.g. torture) is needed. HRW makes clear the necessity and significance of 
research to examine Calderón’s Orwellian newspeak, in order to shed light on the 
discourse of official denial deployed by the government to disavow, minimize, and 
justify the abundant evidence of serious human rights violations reported by victims, 
human rights activists, and international human rights bodies. 
 
Policing uncomfortable truths: how to not talk about human rights violations 
The permanent state of exception that Mexico is currently under has been underpinned 
by what can be termed a the policing of uncomfortable truths: a strategy that seeks to 
conceal reality, an arsenal of rhetoric that serves as a defense mechanism to deny that 
torture and disappearances occur, a policy to normalize the abnormality of an 
unchanging state of emergency. During his administration, Calderón deployed a public 
discourse to deny, reinterpret, or justify human rights violations. This is what Cohen 
(2001: 101) called the “discourse of official denial”: a series of complex—and 
sometimes magical—explanations developed by the state to evade allegations of 
atrocities perpetrated by its agents, namely the police and the military, against its 
citizens. In what follows, I will use Cohen’s sociology of denial to classify and examine 
how Calderón’s administration publicly responded to serious human rights allegations. 
 Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that the collection of quotes 
analyzed in this article are not intended to be a “representative sample”. It should be 
noted that there were official statements that were highly contagious, regardless of the 
frequency of their repetition. The examples that I cite here illustrate how official 
thought and language were constructed and deployed during Calderón’s presidency. 
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They are evidence that such a discourse existed. They illustrate well how the human 
rights crisis was officially handled, how uncomfortable truths were repressed.  
Literal denial 
The first type of disavowal that appears in Calderón’s official responses to allegations 
about human rights violations is what Cohen (2001: 104) called “literal denial”: 
“nothing happened”. Cohen (2001) identified this type of denial primarily in the context 
of dictatorships. In these regimes, he noted, government officials can literally deny that 
atrocities are committed because there is no internal system of accountability, and they 
are generally shielded from international scrutiny. During the Calderón administration, 
this type of denial was very popular against allegations made by Amnesty International 
or HRW. To prepare each of their reports, these organizations carried out extended 
visits to the country, interviewed hundreds of victims, and met with dozens of activists, 
journalists and human rights scholars. Regardless, the Calderón government openly 
denied the evidence produced by these organizations: “The numbers do not lie, there is 
no systematic violation of human rights” (Baranda, 2011). The Ministry of the Interior 
sought to evade the allegations about human rights violations by simply arguing that 
reports published by human rights organizations “do not reflect the real situation” of the 
country (Animal Político, 2012).  
 In 2012, a group of journalists asked the Minister of the Interior why he was 
“discrediting” a report generated by HRW: “the same answer was given when reports 
were produced by Amnesty International and even the agencies of the United Nations”, 
the journalists claimed. The response from Minister of the Interior was firm (and 
incredible):  
What is systematic, even in the cases where there is an allegation of a 
possible human rights violation, is not the violation of human rights, but, on 
the contrary, what is systemic is the adherence to the law. That is, what is 
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systematic (…) is the adherence to human rights (Presidencia de la 
República 2012). 
  
Literal denial was also repeated against findings made by the press. The United 
States-based newspaper The Washington Post reported on abuses committed by the 
army. Their reporting was based on testimonies of people tortured by the military, and 
analysis of over 2,000 complaints presented by citizens to the National Commission on 
Human Rights. Faced with this wealth of information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
dismissed the story: “no evidence is provided” (Hernández, 2009). The public officials 
in the ministries of the interior and foreign affairs did not feel obliged to offer complex 
responses to reject the information presented by human rights organizations. For them, 
there was no information, or evidence, or human rights violations.  
 Cohen (2001) identified another type of literal denial: the discrediting of the 
reliability and credibility of those who suffered abuses or reported them. According to 
this logic, no one can believe in the existence of human rights violations because the 
victims are surely lying, the human rights organizations are partial, and press reports are 
motivated by political interests. According to this type of literal denial any information 
about abuses perpetrated during the Calderón administration was false. For example:  
The troops that operate in [X] Military Zone have had successful results in 
fighting drug trafficking, and, due to this, they have been subjected to 
constant media-based smear campaigns, through social mobilizations, paid 
by the drug traffickers of the Gulf cartel, based on false arguments of 
alleged mistreatment and abuses by military personnel (Milenio, 2007).  
 
Thus the military argued that human rights abuses were not really occurring, they were 
all fantasies, inventions made up by criminal groups with the political aim of 
discrediting the army. 
 In 2012, a group of journalists asked the Minister of the Interior a question on a 
situation that had by then become evident: “Isn’t the federal government closed off from 
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the scrutiny of and observation of international bodies?” “On the contrary”, responded 
the minister. The real problem was that the HRW report had “errors” and 
“methodological flaws” (Presidencia de la República 2012). The allegations of serious 
human rights violations—allegations that had been documented ad nauseam by other 
national and international human rights actors—were irrelevant. The methods section of 
the report was the real issue. 
 The Calderón administration denied that human rights abuses were taking place 
by invoking its purported democratic credentials, employing the following magical 
syllogism: as a good democratic government, we would never permit anything to occur 
that does not adhere to human rights; consequently, human rights are not violated in 
Mexico. For example, when approached for comment about abuses perpetrated by the 
army, the Minister of Foreign Affairs responded: “To respect human rights is a priority 
of the Mexican government, therefore there is no way to imagine that the government is 
encouraging a fight against organized crime that is outside the law” (Hernández, 2009). 
 The last strategy to deny reality consisted in invoking a legal technicality. A 
federal human rights official offered an example of this. When the newspaper Reforma 
asked about the abuses perpetrated by members of the armed forces, the state agent 
responded:  
Initially it might seem that an illegal search was being carried out, or it 
might seem that there was an arbitrary detention, or an abuse, [however] 
until there is no investigation or proof of it, such violations do not exist 
(Jiménez, 2009).  
 
How can human rights violations only “seem” to be true? For the victims, the 
experience of torture, or the violent intrusion of members of the armed forces to their 
homes in the middle of the night, were absolutely real events. 
Interpretive denial 
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Cohen (2001: 105) observed that it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to 
deny the existence of human rights violations, given the presence of greater 
international scrutiny. Faced with evidence of atrocities, governments tended to 
recognize that “something” had indeed happened, but later reinterpreted or reclassified 
the event to make it seem as if the atrocity was something else, to minimize the abuse, 
and to make it appear to be something less disturbing and more acceptable.  
 Interpretive denial is common in countries that aspire to be part of the 
community of Western democracies, but that should be rather grouped with 
undemocratic regimes due to their questionable human rights track record. Thus, in 
countries like Mexico, governments try to evade taking responsibility for their actions 
when criticized by international organizations by using the following syllogism: yes, we 
understand the importance of respecting human rights; yes, we have signed all the 
relevant treaties; yes, we recognize the validity of the human rights bodies that monitor 
our performance; and, no, what the police do is not torture, nor summary executions, it 
is something else. The most sophisticated formula of this type of denial is the 
manipulation of international law jargon: yes, we signed and respect X convention, but 
Article 13, Clause 7, Paragraph 2, does not apply in Mexico; yes, we ratified and 
support Treaty Y, because the country is a democracy, what the Mexican army does is 
actually different from what is stipulated in Article 12, Section 2, Paragraph 6.  
 An example of this can be found in the way the Mexican government dealt with 
the issue of military jurisdiction. Between 2006 and 2012, local and international human 
rights organizations lobbied Calderón’s government to limit the impunity enjoyed by 
the military when they commit abuses against the population (HRW 2009). According 
to international law, military personnel who commit serious human rights violations 
must be investigated and tried by civilian authorities, through effective, impartial, and 
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transparent mechanisms. Throughout Calderón’s term, as in the authoritarian era, it was 
customary for the military to investigate itself, through processes that showed little 
openness to public scrutiny and in which the military served as both judge and 
defendant. Organizations like HRW made a simple and understandable argument:  
An important reason such abuses continue is that they go unpunished. And 
they go unpunished in significant part because most cases end up being 
investigated and prosecuted by the military itself. By allowing the military 
to investigate itself through a system that lacks basic safeguards to ensure 
independence and impartiality, Mexico is, in practice, allowing military 
officers involved in law enforcement activities to commit egregious human 
rights violations with impunity (HRW 2009: 3). 
 
 Throughout the Calderón administration organizations like Amnesty 
International and HRW had condemned the abuses perpetrated by the military and the 
issue of military jurisdiction. In response, on hundreds of occasions the government 
asserted its commitment to the promotion and defense of human rights (Anaya Muñoz 
2014). However, simultaneously, Calderón rejected the allegations of military impunity. 
The government evaded responsibility using variations of the same response: 
For the Mexican State, military jurisdiction is performing efficiently to 
prevent, prosecute, and punish human rights violations that may be 
committed by military personnel in the exercise of their functions, so it is 
not possible to support the recommendation contained in paragraph 94.5 
(Gobierno de Mexico 2009).  
 
Another strategy to reinterpret reality is to use euphemisms, redefining human 
rights violations so they appear less cruel than they are, and using misleading 
terminology that gives the action a respectable status (Cohen 2001: 105). In Mexico, 
euphemisms were useful for reframing the status of victims. When referring to them, the 
Calderón government spoke of “collateral effects” or “collateral damage” (Presidencia 
de la República, 2010c; Jiménez 2012). The most notorious example of this strategy 
occurred with the death of the elderly Ernestina Ascencio Rosario. The media reported 
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that Rosario was attacked the day before her death by a group of military personnel. Her 
death, as reported by media investigations, was caused by “head trauma and acute 
anemia produced by hemorrhaging”, which were the result of a “sexual attack” 
(Granados Chapa 2008). Calderón reinterpreted what happened: the lady “died of 
mistreated chronic gastritis” (Gallegos & Herrera 2007).  
Cohen (2001: 108) used the term “magical legalism” to refer to the discourse 
used by some governments to “prove” that an allegation was incorrect or unfounded 
because the event or act is prohibited by law, or already addressed through a 
government program, and so, in theory, it should not be happening. Magical legalism is 
based on the following syllogism: torture, forced disappearances, and, in general, any 
other human rights violations are prohibited; this government has stipulated this in a 
legal disposition; therefore, what the human rights organizations report cannot be true. 
In 2009, the National Commission on Human Rights publicized a disturbing report: in 
six months, more than 9,000 undocumented migrants in transit in Mexico were 
kidnapped by state officials and criminal organizations (CNDH 2009). Once kidnapped, 
migrants were starved, ill-treated, tortured, and extorted. Women (and men) were raped 
or sexually exploited. Some migrants were selected for forced labor. Some selected for 
death. A month later, the director of the National Migration Institute (NMI) responded 
with a magical legalism. The NMI claimed to share the “concern for the increasing 
problems faced by migrants… that transit through the country”, but, the director 
clarified, the NMI had already “implemented various measures in the past year to drive 
the immediate and coordinated action of public security authorities and law enforcement 
to combat and attend to the victims of kidnapping” (Secretaría de Gobernación 2009). 
For the Calderón government, “the increasing problems faced by migrants” – that is, 
torture, forced disappearances, kidnappings, forced labor, illegal detentions and killings 
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– had already been addressed through “various measures”, so there was nothing further 
to discuss.  
Another strategy for reinterpreting reality is to deny responsibility for what has 
occurred. The Calderón government cleverly used linguistic resources to create the 
impression that atrocities had occurred by themselves, instead of accepting that they 
were perpetrated by state security agents: e.g. “five or forty people died yesterday in 
various confrontations”. Alternatively, the government would use semantic juggling to 
make it appear that responsibility could not be attributed to any particular government 
body. For example, to avoid recognizing the responsibility of the armed forces in the 
commission of human rights abuses, the Calderón government developed the following 
argument: 
The military legislation provides for all of these kinds of events, to avoid 
violations of individual guarantees, but there are some circumstances in 
which unfortunately it is inevitable or possible that some problems are 
generated that lead to the harm of persons or property (Jiménez 2009). 
 
In 2010, a father and his son were driving along the motorway between two 
cities in northern Mexico. When they attempted to overtake “units” of a “joint 
operational base”, the family was executed by members of the security forces. A little 
later, the administration publicly lamented their “death”—or rather, their extrajudicial 
execution by agents of the state. The administration later concluded:  
We will be reviewing the communication protocols, so that the inhabitants 
of the areas surrounding the locations of these operations always have 
relevant information so that they may collaborate and follow the instructions 
of the authorities, whose primary objective at all times is to ensure the 
safety of the population. Unfortunately, this was not the case this time 
(Presidencia de la República 2010(a)).  
 
Responsibility for the outcome in this situation did not belong to the agents that 
executed the citizens, but rather to the citizens that should have had the information on 
how to collaborate with the authority (so as not to be executed).  
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Implicatory denial 
There are occasions were the evidence is so widely known that there is little room for 
reinterpretation, and much less for literal denial. In these cases, governments accept that 
they were responsible for violent acts, but minimize their effects or implications (Cohen 
2001: 109).  
 One method used by Calderón’s administration to justify human rights violations 
that could not be hidden was to invoke morally superior ideals: for example, claiming a 
“future that we aspire to”, “a free Mexico, a safe Mexico, a Mexico that the Mexicans 
deserve” (Presidencia de la República 2007a). The Calderón government argued that we 
were “prepared for a battle that will be long, which will require resources and, 
unfortunately, also human lives, but it is a battle we must face to safeguard the future of 
Mexico” (Presidencia de la República 2007b). The Minister of the Interior justified the 
war against drugs and its terrible consequences on the grounds that “in this battle defeat 
does not exist” even if that “involves the loss of life” (El Financiero 2008).  
 Another strategy was to invoke the idea of necessity: what happened is justified 
because “something had to be done”, because there was no other alternative. The war on 
drugs was “an arduous and difficult battle” that “unfortunately has cost and will cost 
human lives”. However, according to President Calderón, there was no other option 
and, therefore, action was justified: “The alternative is clear: either we restore order and 
the minimum security conditions or Mexico will not move forward” (Presidencia de la 
República, 2007a).  
 The Calderón administration also sought to dehumanize the victims of violence 
(and their families), turning them into “enemies” of the community, the nation, and 
Mexico. This policy popularized the idea that some victims and alleged drug-traffickers 
were not part of the political community, and they therefore ceased to enjoy the right to 
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equal protection before the law, people whose suffering was not a source of indignation, 
but rather of reassurance (Madrazo Lajous 2013).  
 Another strategy was to refer to all the victims of violence as criminals. By 
criminalizing the victims, Calderón implicitly blamed them for their misfortune, 
suggesting that they deserved their fate. For Calderón, the casualties of the war were 
“gentlemen” who “are killing each other” (Presidencia de la República 2010b). For the 
National Defense Secretariat, human rights complaints were false because they had not 
been submitted by the victims or their families, but “by members of organized crime, in 
order to discredit the Army, and thus limit their operations” (Martínez 2012). The 
popular phrase “en algo estarían metidos” (they must have been involved in something) 
poignantly reflects how this official discourse found social acceptance. 
 Contextualization is the discursive strategy that accepts that events occurred, but 
attempts to minimize their effects by evoking a unique context for them—so unique and 
exceptional that only those who were there could understand. According to this logic, 
those who were not there cannot really understand what occurred, and thus have no 
moral authority to question what happened (Cohen 2001: 111). For example, in 2007, 
according to the newspaper Reforma, two women and three children were shot dead in 
Sinaloa. They were heading to a funeral and, because they were going at a high speed, 
the driver was not able to stop the car when a group of military personnel ordered him 
to do so (Jiménez 2009). In response to this, the army offered the following 
justification: “I think that it is inevitable [to make mistakes], it does not excuse the 
issue, they are simply circumstances that only the person who is living them, in that 
place, will understand” (Jiménez 2009). 
 The last strategy used to justify the occurrence of human rights violations was 
based on the idea that Calderón was morally superior to his critics, because he initiated 
19 
the war against drugs. Calderón employed this strategy in 2009 with Amnesty 
International. According to media reports, the organization was denouncing the obvious 
situation: “The Army’s abuses and violations have reached a scandalous level due to 
their excesses.” Amnesty International’s Mexican representative stated that Amnesty 
had already denounced the “pattern of crimes committed by the army in their 
operations,” although “the Mexican civil and military authorities denied the forced 
disappearances and severe torture” (El Universal 2009). To address this, President 
Calderón called people to “ignore the voices that naively propose that the State 
withdraw from the fight [against drug trafficking]” (El Universal 2009).  
 
The repercussions of denial 
The Calderón administration’s response to accusations of human rights abuses was a 
mixture of evasions, half-truths, legalisms, euphemisms, and peculiar factual objections. 
In what follows, let me explore, at least tentatively, two potential effects of such 
discourse of denial in Mexico’s war on drugs. 
 
Languaje rules and low-level officials 
The emerging literature on human rights violations in the context of Mexico’s war on 
drugs has focused on the analysis of new and old laws, institutions, and bureaucratic 
inertia. According to these studies, the human rights crisis emerged because the 
Mexican government created laws that limit the fundamental rights of citizens, because 
of the increasing number of military personnel who perform police functions without 
being properly trained to do so, and because the Mexican justice system permits law 
enforcement agents and the public ministry to mistreat and torture detainees without 
judges halting these practices. This analysis is correct, but incomplete. We have yet to 
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understand how so many state agents choose to engage in practices that violate human 
rights and what steps they follow to do so. We still have very limited knowledge of how 
so many Mexicans who work for the state in the fields of security and justice tolerate or 
agree to take part in practices that should be absolutely unacceptable, such as torture. 
Publicly, the official discourse of denial has been normally deployed by high-level state 
agents – e.g., the president, the minister of foreign affairs, who are not direct 
perpetrators – as a reaction to human rights allegations. But, we might want ask, what is 
the effect of such discourse in low-level security officials who actually perpetrate 
violence? 
 There are no sociological or criminological scholarly studies to date on the 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations in Mexico’s war on drugs. However, prior 
research on state crimes in other countries may be useful to shed light on what occurs in 
the country. Studies on atrocities committed by state agents in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Timor-Leste have emphasized the importance of the process through which the 
perpetrators transform their perception of torture, forced disappearances, or summary 
executions, to the point that these acts come to be regarded as normal, acceptable, 
morally right, and routine (Huggins et al. 2002; Stanley 2009). Kelman (1995), for 
example, notes that atrocity perpetrators go through a training phase in which the moral 
restraints that hinder a person from committing acts they would normally repudiate are 
weakened. Similarly, Kooijmans (1995: 16) argues that “no man is born a torturer”. 
Perpetrators of state crimes, he claims, are “drawn into a web”, which encloses them 
“gradually but relentlessly” and from which they are “hardly ever able to disentangle” 
themselves (Kooijmans 1995: 16). They become members of a “sub-group”, Kooijmans 
(1995: 16) concludes, and even find the arguments to explain to themselves the “inner 
logic” of their behavior.  
21 
 These studies suggest that perpetrators of state crimes go through what can be 
called a learning process during which language plays a crucial role: it allows those who 
learned to perceive torture as an acceptable practice to defend themselves against 
questioning from the rest of society, which still sees torture as morally unacceptable. As 
Howard Becker (1963: 31) showed in his studies on the sociology of deviance, 
individuals “learn” to participate in a subculture organized around a particular deviant 
activity. In this process of learning, individuals engaged in deviant activities seek to 
justify their deeds, which are not seen as valid by the rest of society; and they do so 
through the development of a particular language, special vocabularies that allow them 
to neutralize the force of law-abiding values (Becker 1963: 28). This is why Crelinsten 
(2003) claimed that in regimes where torture is pervasive, those who have the monopoly 
of violence create an alternative reality based on language that permits the 
normalization or justification of their atrocities. 
 Kelman (1995) suggests that the official discourse of denial matters mainly for 
two reasons: it provides authorization from authorities for these acts to occur, and it 
facilitates the dehumanization of victims. Authorization does not necessitate explicit 
approval for the violation of human rights from senior government officials. It is 
sufficient that low-level security officials “believe and have good reason to believe that 
the action is authorized, expected, at least tolerated, and probably approved by the 
authorities” (Kelman 1995: 21). Senior management might not have given specific 
orders to commit abuses, but they created the atmosphere in which subordinates feel 
they have permission to do so. It is important to emphasize, as Hannah Arendt (1994: 
86) argued, that the “net effect” of these “language rules”, of this “language system”, 
which seeks to disguise atrocity through ephemisms and lies, is “not to keep these 
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people ignorant of what they were doing, but to prevent them from equating it with their 
old, ‘normal’ knowledge of murder and lies”. 
 Therefore, one potential effect of the discourse of official denial deployed by the 
Calderón administration may well be that it facilitated a linguistic and ideological 
arsenal for a large number of direct perpetrators, low-level state officials, to deny, 
reinterpret, and justify human rights violations. There is enough evidence available to 
conclude that many state agents practice torture, extrajudicial executions, or 
disappearances in the context of the drug war, but the official discourse rarely accepts 
that this occurs. According to the administration’s official responses, human rights 
violations never take place, or they only “seem” like human rights violations, but are 
actually “something else”, and if they have occurred they are somehow justified. 
 Finally, “through this mis-recognition” state perpetrators of crimes are “rarely 
recognized” as such in official discourse. Consequently, “they too become something 
else”—“security agents”, “crime fighters”, patriots, loyal Mexicans, Mexican heroes, or 
whatever (Stanley 2004: 8). Certainly, it would be misleading to say that all the security 
forces in Mexico perpetrate abuses. However, as Huggins (2000: 61) notes regarding 
countries where serious human rights are systematically violated, “someone who had 
been in one of these internal security agencies would have either committed violence 
against suspects or been present when such violence had taken place”—in other words, 
“would at least have been a silent participant in or witness” to atrocity. 
 Very few of the direct perpetrators of human rights abuses committed in the 
context of Mexico’s war on drugs have been brought to justice: for instance, in the last 
ten years, only 59 members of the military have been, apparently, sent to prison for 
allegedly committing human rights violations (Garcia 2016). A group of journalist is 
currently seeking to talk to some of them (Cadena de mando 2017). So far, six members 
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of the military under detention have been interviewed. Parts of such interviews have 
been made public. What these perpetrators are confessing give a glimpse of what they 
do, and about what they say they think they do: those killed are enemies (“the fucking 
delinquency should be eradicated”; “traitors to the homeland… must be eliminated”); 
they were just following orders (“I just receive such order [to kill someone]… because 
the dead do not talk”); what happened was justified (“if they give us the green light 
means that you are free to do what you want, if you notice someone suspicious you can 
frisk or fire”); it is the only language they understand (“to obtain information it is 
necessary to beat a person”); they had no choice (“we are given high caliber weapons… 
that is why we are accused of being so brutal”); we cannot know what it was like to be 
there (“the adrenaline factor during combat”).  
 Clearly, these are not sophisticated or enigmatic vocabularies, but accounts that 
echo the official discourse promoted by high-level officials. These accounts were learnt, 
and were drawn from a well-established, authorized existing pool. Thus, the official 
discourse of denial seems to allow low-level officials to have a plausible story about 
what they did, and a moral account that justifies why they did it. 
 
Living in a lie 
Another potential effect of the policing of uncomfortable truths has to do with the rest 
of society. Crelinsten (2003) argues that regimes where atrocities are routinely 
committed are possible because society has been predisposed—even trained—to accept 
that these happen. This “training” is based on a formal discourse that allow people to 
reconstruct reality—a reality where abuses occur but where they are acceptable or 
justifiable, where victims do not exist or do not matter. To explore the possible 
relationship between the official discourse of denial and the response of ordinary 
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Mexicans to human rights violations, I draw on information from the Mexican 2014 
National Survey on Organized Violence (NSOV).  
The NSOV (2014) survey shows that more than 60 percent of Mexicans believe 
that the likelihood that a person detained by security forces will have access to due 
process is very remote or nonexistent. The same percentage of Mexicans recognize that 
human rights violations perpetrated by the police and the army are “frequent” (NSOV 
2014). These answers do not emerge from unfounded suspicions, but rather from 
everyday experiences. Almost 40 percent said they in fact know “someone” who has 
been “abused by the police”, and one in eight knows “someone” who was “abused by 
the army” (NSOV 2014).  
What awaits a Mexican placed in arraigo detention?, the NSOV (2014) asked. 
The answers to this question, says Schedler, who crafted and coordinated the survey, are 
a “look into hell” (Schedler 2015: 186). Nearly 70 percent of Mexicans believe that it is 
“somewhat likely” or “very likely” that the police will manufacture false evidence on 
detained citizens. About the same percentage believe that the detainees will be tortured 
by state officials. Finally, half estimated that it was “somewhat likely” or “very likely” 
that a person detained by the police will “never” be seen again by their family – that is, 
forced disappearances (NSOV 2014). 
And, again, these answers do not come from unproven opinions. As Magaloni 
Kerpel (2015: 37) has demonstrated recently, on average, during the Calderón 
administration 20 percent of those individuals currently held in federal prisons argue 
that they were forced to incriminate someone else, were asked for money, or received 
threats from security agents. Moreover, 80 per cent of those Mexicans detained by 
security forces in the context of the war on drugs suffered abuses, which include 
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waterboarding, asphyxia, electric shocks, sexual violence, and burns (Magaloni 2015: 
41).  
Thus, it is clear that, as these surveys reveal, Mexicans can hardly argue that 
they do not know what is currently happening in the country. It shows that they are well 
aware that the authorities perpetrate serious human rights violations in the context of the 
war on drugs. But how do they process this knowledge about the role of the state 
bureaucracy in perpetrating this violence? And what do they do with this knowledge? 
In a country where one in eight citizens has been abused by those members of 
the military deployed throughout Mexico, the survey asked respondents whether they 
had participated in any demonstration, march, picketing, or any other event to protest 
against this war that visibly affects them: 90 percent said they never protested in any 
way against the violence of the war (NSOV 2014). Apparently, it is not even an issue 
that deserves to be discussed in private. More than 60 percent prefer to speak little or 
not at all about this type of violence with their relatives (NSOV 2014). The same 
percentage believes, following the official rhetoric, that too much has already been said 
regarding the drug war and violence (NSOV 2014). 
One of the most powerful discursive strategies used by the Calderón government 
was the dehumanization of the victims of the war, referring to them as criminals or 
enemies of the nation. What is the social perception of this? The NSOV (2014) shows 
that nearly two-thirds of the population agreed with Calderón’s diagnosis: violence is 
selective: if people do not mess with drug-traffickers, nothing will happen to them. 
Following this reasoning, those who experienced violence might have been involved in 
something (and thus they got what they deserved). 
The widely held perception of the victims as criminals and enemies has rendered 
them invisible—they are guilty of something, so their fate apparently does not matter. 
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On average, in Mexico more than ten people disappear without a trace each day. The 
mass media reports daily about the most dramatic cases. Yet 80 percent of Mexicans do 
not recall any case of disappearance or death that has moved them (NSOV 2014). The 
NSOV (2014) also shows that the same percentage of the population declares not to 
remember the name of any disappeared or murdered person. Hence Schedler (2015: 
146) warns that “the dead” in the fight against drugs “are not only strangers. They are 
alien.” “Absent in the public sphere,” he concludes, “the victims are also absent in the 
private sphere of minds and hearts.” 
The official policing of uncomfortable truths may have facilitated the contempt 
held by Mexican society towards those relatives of victims of human rights abuses who, 
despite many obstacles, are organized to call for truth and justice. More than half of the 
population are not aware at all of the existence of non-governmental organizations 
formed by victims’ relatives in Mexico. According to the NSOV (2014), nearly 80 
percent of Mexicans say they do not know if there is a victims’ movement in their city, 
and over 60 percent say they have never heard of these movements ever. The survey 
asked these Mexicans how much they identified with victims who organized and 
created non-governmental organizations, support groups and so on, for example, the 
organizations of mothers of the disappeared. The NSOV (2014) reveals that more than 
60 percent of Mexicans said they empathize “little” or “not at all” with victims. 
Certainly, our understanding of how ordinary Mexicans receive and digest 
knowledge about violence and human rights abuses – and how they act in consequence 
– is minimal. This study may invite further research on the subject. Bystanders are 
neither perpetrators, nor victims. Yet, they are central to atrocity and violence because 
their indifference and inaction facilitate evildoing (Bauman 2003). Bystanders have 
great power: “through omission”, they “have the power to exonerate and implicitly 
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condone and encourage perpetrators; through resistance, demonstrating and pressurizing 
government, they can positively impact on the escalation of brutalities” (Seu 2013: 18). 
 
Conclusions 
This article sought to explore the official discourse that the Calderón administration 
deployed in order to deny, reinterpret, or justify serious human rights violations 
perpetrated by security forces in the context of the war on drugs. This article shows the 
importance of exploring the language that has authorized these legal dispositions and 
their effects to exist in the first place. The government’s policing of uncomfortable 
truths sought to normalize the abnormality of a permanent state of exception where 
serious human rights violations take place systematically. According to the official 
discourse, the atrocities committed by the state bureaucracy never happened, are 
something else, or can be justified. So, in Mexico two completely distinct realities 
coexist: the world of the victims and human rights activists in which serious human 
rights violations take place; and the world of state officials, in which adherence to the 
law is the norm, and where human rights abuses never happen. 
As said, unlike Calderón, President Peña Nieto has spent considerably less time 
talking about the war: literal denial – “nothing happens”. The official discourse has 
focused on other issues, such as the energy reform. Yet, when human rights 
organizations challenged the occurrence of serious human rights abuses, Peña Nieto’s 
government used the same strategy as his predecessor. In 2014, for instance, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture demonstrated that torture in Mexico was a generalized 
practice. The Peña Nieto administration answered that the UN Rapporteur was acting in 
an “irresponsible manner”, as he talked with “no evidence”. 
28 
This article addresses the case of Mexico but invites us to think about how other 
democracies deal with serious human rights abuses. This was Stan Cohen’s aim when 
he first became interested in the discourse of official denial in the late 1980s. Back then, 
Cohen lived in Israel and collaborated with an organization of human rights that 
documented the use of torture by Israeli officials against Palestinian prisoners. Cohen 
(1991: 27) tried to understand how in Israel “the same political space is shared by brutal 
repression and democratic institutions”. He found out that in the Israeli democracy state 
agents were “engaged in ritual denials, accusations of worldwide bias against Israel, 
uncheckable promises to investigate each allegation, or appeals to preposterous 
legalistic sophistry to explain why, for example, the Geneva Convention does not apply 
to the Occupied Territories”. At the end of his life, Cohen (2005) invited us to think 
about the way the United States government justified the use of torture in Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib. He often cited George Orwell’s prophecy: the time would come when 
practices like torture would be “tolerated and even defended by people who considered 
themselves enlightened and progressive” (Cohen 1991: 25). 
 Hopefully, this article will encourage a critical reflection about the language 
used to conceal the devastating effects of the wars on drugs that are currently taking 
place in many countries in Latin America or, for example, in the Philippines under 
Rodrigo Duterte’s rule. Wars on drugs are legitimized, without evidence, as necessary 
and inevitable, but its effects – serious violations of human rights – are simply denied or 
minimized. As Taussig eloquently put it in his analyses about Colombia and Argentina: 
the dirty wars and the wars on drugs are made possible because they come together with 
a war of silencing: “there is no officially declared war. No prisoners. No torture. No 
disappearing”: “this is more than the production of silence. It is silencing” (Taussig 
1989: 26). And the point about silencing is not to erase memory, but to generate 
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uncertainty and, crucially, fear: the point is to frighten citizens into saying nothing 
publicly that could be deemed as critical of the security forces. 
 Finally, perhaps this article will stimulate some discussion on how to understand 
and classify Mexico’s current political regime. Can democratic institutions, human 
rights, and liberties survive under a permanent state of exception? Can crimes against 
humanity take place within a democracy? The NSOV (2014) shows that the political 
regime in Mexico functions, at least partly, through the fear that the state security forces 
generate among citizens. What do you call a regime in which the majority of the 
population fears that state agents can torture and disappear those they detain? As Martha 
Huggins et al (2001: xxi) argue, “the possibility of a totalitarian dynamic made up of 
ordinary citizen bystanders, atrocity facilitators who are not directly violent, as well as 
of the perpetrators of direct violence indeed exists for democracies, to their peril”. 
 
REFERENCES 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. (2013, June 4) Confronting a nightmare. Disappearances in 
Mexico. [Online]. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR41/025/2013/en/ [31 
May 2017]. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, et al., (2016) “Civil Society Assessment of the Human Rights 
Situation in Mexico”, Executive Summary of a Memo to The U.S. Department of State 
Regarding Conditions on U.S. Assistance [Online]. Available: 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/878016/download [19 December 2017]. 
 ANAYA MUÑOZ, Alejandro. (2014) Communicative Interaction Between Mexico and Its 
International critics Around the Issue of Military Jurisdiction: “Rhetorical Action” or “Truth 
Seeking Arguing”. Journal of Human Rights, 13(4), 434-455. 
ANIMAL POLÍTICO. (2012, January 23) El informe de HRW ‘no refleja situación real de 
México’: Segob. [Online]. Available: http://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/01/el-informe-de-
hrw-no-refleja-situacion-real-de-mexico-segob/ [31 May 2017]. 
ARENDT, Hannah. (1994) Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Reporto n the Banality of Evil (New 
York: Penguin Books). 
BALLINAS, Víctor, and BECERRIL, Andrea. (2012, November 22) Aumentaron 500% los 
casos de tortura con Calderón: CNDH. La Jornada, 2. 
BARANDA, Antonio. (2011, June 7). Niega Poiré militarización. Reforma. 
30 
BAUMAN, Zygmunt. (2003) From Bystander to Actor. Journal of Human Rights 2(2), 137-
151. 
BECKER, Howard. (1963) Outsiders. Studies in the sociology of deviance (New York: The 
Free Press). 
BENÍTEZ MANAUT, Raúl (Ed.). (2017) Crimen organizado e iniciativa Mérida en las 
relaciones México-Estados Unidos (Mexico City: CASEDE). 
CADENA DE MANDO. (2017) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cadenademando.org/index.html [1 June 2017]. 
CHABAT, Jorge. (2010) Combatting Drugs in Mexico under Calderon: The Inevitable War. 
Working Paper No. 205 (Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas). 
COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (CNDH). (2009) Informe 
Especial sobre los casos de secuestro en contra de migrantes (Mexico City: Comisión Nacional 
de los Derechos Humanos). 
COHEN, Stanley. (1991) Talking about torture in Israel. Tikkun, 6(6): 23-30, 89-90. 
COHEN, Stanley. (1996) Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials 
and Counterclaims. Human Rights Quarterly, 18(3), 517-543. 
COHEN, Stanley. (2001) States of Denial. Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (London: 
Polity). 
COHEN, Stanely. (2005) Post-Moral Torture: From Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib, Index on 
Censorship, 34(1), 24-30. 
CRELINSTEN, Ronald. D. (2003) The World of Torture. Theoretical Criminology, 7 (3), 293-
318. 
DALY, Chaterine, et al., (2012) Armed with Impunity. Curbing Military Human Rights Abuses 
in Mexico [Online]. Available: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/2012_ARMEDWITHIMPUNITY.pdf [19 December 2017]. 
DEATON, Janice, and RODRIGUEZ FERREIRA, Octavio. (2015) Detention Without Charge. 
The Use of Arraigo for Criminal Investigations in Mexico [Online]. Available: 
https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/150112_ARRAIGO_Final.pdf [19 
December 2017]. 
EL FINANCIERO. (2008, February 5). Al narcotráfico se le ha delimitado: Mouriño. [Online]. 
Available: http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/02/al-narcotrafico-se-le-ha-delimitado-
mourino/ [31 May 2017]. 
EL UNIVERSAL. (2009, December 10) Calderón rechaza retiro militar; acusa AI al Ejército. 
[Online] Available: http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/columnas/81384.html [31 May 2017]. 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH). (2017). Mexico 
Coahuila. Ongoing crimes against humanity. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/angmexico_coahuila_ongoing_crimes_against_humanity_fidh-
final_a_revisar-1.pdf [19 December2017]. 
GALLEGOS, Elena, and HERRERA, Claudia. (2007, March 13). Entrevista a Felipe Calderón, 
Presidente de la República Mexicana. La Jornada. [Online]. Available: 
31 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/03/entrevista-a-felipe-calderon-presidente-de-la-
republica-mexicana/ [31 May 2017]. 
GARCIA, Dennis. (2016, December 16) Militares. A guerra contra el narco le falta certeza 
jurídica. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2016/12/16/militares-guerra-contra-
el-narco-le-falta-certeza-juridica [31 May 2017]. 
GOBIERNO DE MÉXICO. (2009) Respuesta complementaria del Gobierno de México a las 
recomendaciones formuladas en el Informe del Grupo de Trabajo sobre el Examen Periódico 
Universal. [Online] Available: 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/MX/A_HRC_11_27_Add1_MEX_S.p
df  [1 June 2017]. 
GRANADOS CHAPA, Miguel Angel (2008, February 17). Ernestina Ascensio Rosario. 
Reforma. 
HERNÁNDEZ, Jaime. (2009, July 18). SRE desestima acusaciones de abuso militares. El 
Universal. [Online]. Available: http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/169790.html [31 May 
2017]. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW). (2009) Uniform Impunity. Mexico's Misuse of Military 
Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations (New York: 
Human Rights Watch). 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW). (2011) Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, 
and Disappearances in Mexico’s War on Drugs (New York: Human Rights Watch). 
HUGGINS, Martha. (2000) Legacies of Authoritarianism: Brazilian Torturers’ and Murderers’ 
Reformulation of Memory. Latin American Perspectives, 27(2), 57-78. 
HUGGINS, Martha et al. (2002) Violence Workers. Police Torturers and Murderers 
Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley. University of California Press). 
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (IACHR). (2013) Human Rights 
of Migrants and Other Personas in the Context of Human Mobility In Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 
Doc. 48/13 (Washington: Organization of American States). 
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (IACHR). (2015) The Human 
Rights Situation in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 44/15 (Washington: Organization of 
American States). 
JIMÉNEZ, Benito. (2009, March 14) Admite Sedena daños a civiles. Reforma. 
JIMÉNEZ, Benito. (2012, January 16) Aumentan muertes de civiles inocentes. Reforma. 
KELMAN, Herbert. (1995) The Social Context of Torture: Policy Process and Authority 
Structure. In The Politics of Pain: Torturers and Their Masters, R. D. Crelinsten, & A. Schmid, 
(Eds.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). 
KOOIJMANS, Pieter. (1995) Torturers and Their Masters. In The Politics of Pain: Torturers 
and Their Masters, R. D. Crelinsten, & A. Schmid, (Eds.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 
LEVI, Primo (1987, December 17) Beyond Judgment. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1987/12/17/beyond-judgment/ [31 May 2017]. 
32 
MADRAZO LAJOUS, Alejandro. (2013) ¿Criminales y enemigos? El narcotraficante mexicano 
en el discurso oficial y en el narcocorrido. Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría 
Constitucional y Política, Violencia, Legitimidad y Orden Público. (Buenos Aires: Libraria 
Ediciones). 
MADRAZO LAJOUS, Alejandro. (2014) The Constitutional Costs of the War on Drugs. In 
Ending the Drug Wars. Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy 
(London: London School of Economics). 
MAGALONI KERPEL, Ana Laura. (2015) La arbitrariedad como método de trabajo: la 
persecución criminal durante la administración de Felipe Calderón. In De la detención a la 
prisión. La justicia penal a examen, C. Pérez Correa (ed.) (Mexico City: Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia Económicas). 
MARTÍNEZ, Paris. (2012, February 13) ¿A qué equivalen exactamente los “errores” del 
Ejército? [Online] Available: http://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/02/a-que-equivalen-
exactamente-los-errores-del-ejercito/ [31 May 2017]. 
MÉNDEZ, Juan. (2014) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez. Mission to Mexico. UN Doc. 
A/HRC/28/68/Add.3 (New York: United Nations). 
MERCILLE, Julien. (2011) Violent Narco-Cartles or US Hegemony? The Political economy of 
the ‘war on drugs’ in Mexico. Third World Quarterly, 32(9), 1637-1653. 
MERCILLE, Julien. (2013) The Media-Entertainment Industry and the ‘War on Drugs’ in 
Mexico. Latin Amperican Perspectives, 195(41), 110-129. 
MILENIO (2007, December 10). Denuncia Ejército desprestigio. Milenio. 
NSOV. (2014) National Survey on Organized Violence in Mexico. Coordinated by Andreas 
Schedler (Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas). 
OPEN SOCIETY FUNDATION. (2016) Undeniable Atrocities. Confronting crimes against 
humanity in Mexico. (New York: Open Society Fundation). 
PALEY, Dawn. (2014) Drug War Capitalism. (Oakland: AK Press).  
PÉREZ CORREA, Catalina et al. (2015, July 1) Índice de letalidad. Menos enfrentamientos, 
más opacidad. Nexos. [Online]. Available: http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=25468 [31 May 
2017]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2006, December 11) Anuncio sobre la operación 
conjunta Michoacán: Presidencia de la República. [Online]. Available: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/anuncio-sobre-la-operacion-conjunta-michoacan/ 
[31 May 2017]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2007a, February 16) Palabras del presidente Felipe 
Calderón durante la inauguración de la XXXI Reunión ordinaria de la Conferencia Nacional 
de Gobernadores. Presidencia de la República. [Online] Available: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/02/palabras-del-presidente-felipe-calderon-durante-la-
inauguracion-de-la-xxxi-reunion-ordinaria-de-la-conferencia-nacional-de-gobernadores/ [31 
May 2017]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2007b, March 15) El presidente Calderón en la 
presentación del balance de inicio de gobierno: Presidencia de la República. 
33 
[Online].Available: http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2007/03/el-presidente-calderon-en-la-
presentacion-del-balance-de-inicio-de-gobierno/ [15 March 2007]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2010a, September 6) Conferencia de prensa de 
Alejandro Poiré: Presidencia de la República. [Online] Available: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/09/conferencia-de-prensa-de-alejandro-poire/ [31 May 
2017]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2010b, November 30) Entrevista del Presidente 
Calderón con el periodista Joaquín López Dóriga: Presidencia de la República. [Online] 
Available: http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/11/entrevista-del-presidente-calderon-con-
el-periodista-joaquin-lopez-doriga/ [31 May 2017]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2010c, August 12) Diversas intervenciones de los 
gobernadores en el Diálogo por la Seguridad: Presidencia de la República. [Online] Available: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2010/08/diversas-intervenciones-de-los-gobernadores-en-el-
dialogo-por-la-seguridad-parte-3/ [31 May 2017]. 
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. (2012). Conferencia de prensa del Dr. Alejandro Poiré, 
Secretario de Gobernación: Presidencia de la República. [Online] Available: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2012/01/conferencia-de-prensa-del-dr-alejandro-poire-
secretario-de-gobernacion/ [24 January 2012]. 
SCHEDLER, Andreas. (2014) The Criminal Subversion of Mexican Democracy. Journal of 
Democracy, 25(1), 5-18.  
SCHEDLER, Andreas (2015) En la niebla de la guerra. Los ciudadanos ante la violencia 
criminal organizada (Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas). 
SECRETARÍA DE GOBERNACIÓN. (2009, July 15). Comparte INM preocupación de la 
CNDH sobre secuestro de migrantes. Comunicado 123/09: Dirección General de 
Comunicación Social, Secretaría de Gobernación. [Online]. Available: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2009/07/comparte-inm-preocupacion-de-la-cndh-sobre-
secuestro-de-migrantes/ [31 May 2017]. 
SEU, Irene Bruna. (2013) Passivity Generation. Human Rights and Everyday Morality 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
SHIRK, David. (2011) The Drug War in Mexico. Confronting a Shared Threat (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations). 
STANLEY, Elizabeth. (2004) Torture, Silence and Recognition. Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice, 16(1), 5-25. 
STANLEY, Elizabeth. (2009) Torture, Truth, and Justice: The Case of Timor-Leste (London: 
Routledge). 
TAUSSIG, Mick. (1989) Terror as Usual: Walter Benjamin’s Theory of History as a State of 
Siege. Social Text, 23, 3-20. 
